Ahmed Helmy
University of Exeter
BA in Philosophy and Politics (First Year)
6TH October 2024
In Elaine Landry’s article: Recollection and the Mathematician’s Method in Plato’s Meno, a very interesting interpretation of Plato’s theory of recollection is proposed. In traditional interpretations of the Meno, most assume Plato is attempting to deliver the point that knowledge is innate to humanity, learning is rather recollecting previously stored knowledge from within one’s brain, than learning something new. This is famously illustrated through the analogy of the slave boy. Socrates guides a Slave with no prior education to solving a geometrical problem, without ever telling him the answer. Many academics have presumed Plato’s position as being “Knowledge is innate” and the slave boy being evidence of so.
However, according to Landry, Plato’s theory of recollection should not be taken as method, or mere myth. Instead, it ought to be taken as a hypothesis for learning[1]. Arguing the only demonstrated methods in the Meno are the elenchus (The Socratic Method) and the Hypothetical[2]. Landry emphasizes that Plato’s Meno demonstrates the use of recollection as a meta-epistemic hypothesis[3]. This in turn allows for the pursuit of knowledge, in the absence of certainty. Landry argues that the scene of Socrates and the Slave boy should not be used as evidence for the innate nature of knowledge, but rather the usefulness of the hypothetical method as a tool for learning. The hypothetical method is akin to the Mathematician’s method, assuming a possibility and then testing it through inquiry, rather than relying on the alleged innate knowledge.
The process of the mathematician’s hypothetical method is illustrated through Socrates’ discussion with the slave boy[4]. Landry’s argument is further supported by the fact Socrates’ never claims to know the truth about recollection, substantiating the idea that it rather functions as a working hypothesis that enables learning. As mentioned before, this is illustrated through the dialogue where Socrates helps the slave-boy discover geometric knowledge, rather than providing a method or equation to help the boy solve the problem, he guides the boy through a series of inquiries that eventually leads to the boy uncovering the answer on his own. Rather than this being a demonstration of innate knowledge but being a tool for learning. Utilising inquiries and leading the boy to discover his own hypothesis is a method for learning and uncovering knowledge, rather than having the solutions within, it is a method of problem solving through inquiry, to reach the solution.
Another central point of Landry’s thesis, relates to the discussion of Meno’s paradox (MP) and Socrates’ Paradox (SP). MP questions how one can search for knowledge, if they don’t know what knowledge is, therefore if you already know what it is, there is no need to search for it, and if you don’t even know what it is, how could you possibly recognise it once it is found? Socrates proceeds to reframe this as a methodological issue in SP. Which focuses on how we can learn the qualities of something without knowing its full essence. Landry suggests that once we interpret the theory of recollection as hypothesis, it solves Meno’s paradox. As follows in her article:
“1. If learning is recollection, then if recollection is possible, it is possible for the soul to recall what it knew before
.2. If it is possible for the soul to recall what it knew before, then ∼MP.
3. Recollection is possible. (We know this from the myth of the priests, priestesses, and poets.) Therefore, ∼MP.
The second is:
1. If searching is by the method of hypothesis, then if the method of hypothesis yields knowledge, searching is possible.
2. If searching is possible, then ∼SP.
3. The method of hypothesis yields knowledge. (We know this from the slave-boy demonstration.) Therefore, ∼SP.”[5]
Thus, Landry’s argument shows that by framing the platonic theory of recollection as hypothesis, we can resolve both MP and SP. The Mathematician hypothetical method allows for both learning and searching, even when one does not have full knowledge of the object of inquiry. As demonstrated through the slave boy with no geometric education. The proposed reframing by Landry makes Plato’s theory of recollection much clearer as a tool for learning, rather than a claim of innate knowledge.
Building on Landry’s interpretation, Plato’s definition of knowledge and distinction from opinion in The Republic further supports the idea that recollection is not a definitive method. [6]The fact Socrates never outright determines recollection as an objective truth aligns it more with the definition of opinion. In the Republic, knowledge (episteme) is defined as relating to what is, unchangeable truth, while opinion doxa) is related to changeable truth, opinion can be wrong while knowledge cannot. The process in the Meno is based on inquiry and hypothesis, being more akin to opinion, as the nature of this could be questioned, while knowledge cannot. This definition further substantiates Landry’s point that Plato intended to keep recollection as a hypothesis for learning, rather than absolute truth.
In conclusion, I agree with the proposed interpretation by Landry in Recollection and the Mathematician’s Method in Plato’s Meno. Beforehand, I had strongly disagreed with the abstract nature of the platonic theory of recollection, and how it essentially discredited the entire concept of learning something. However once taken as a hypothesis and a tool for learning, I believe that the Meno begins to make far more sense, especially with the addition of Plato’s own definition in The Republic.
[1] Landry, E. (2012) 'Recollection and the Mathematician’s Method in Plato’s Meno', Philosophia Mathematica, 20(2), pp. 143-169
[2] Landry, E. (2012) 'Recollection and the Mathematician’s Method in Plato’s Meno', Philosophia Mathematica, 20(2), p. 145.
[3] Landry, E. (2012) 'Recollection and the Mathematician’s Method in Plato’s Meno', Philosophia Mathematica, 20(2), pp. 149-150.
[4] Landry, E. (2012) 'Recollection and the Mathematician’s Method in Plato’s Meno', Philosophia Mathematica, 20(2), pp. 148-150
[5] Recollection and the Mathematician’s Method in Plato’s Meno', Philosophia Mathematica, 20(2), p. 148.
[6] Plato (1999) The Republic, trans. B. Jowett. Cambridge: MIT Internet Classics Archive. Available at: http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html
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